I just watched Gillo Pontecorvo’s legendary film The Battle of Algiers (1966), about the war for independence fought by the Algerians against the French occupiers.
I then watched all the documentaries (several) on the accompanying 3 Disc Set, giving me a serious shot at being named “Nerd of the Week.”
Nonetheless, the two were a feast for both film and history buffs – and a grand reminder that this “new idea” of a War on Terror is perhaps the wonderful example of how history, for so many reasons, slips down the human memory hole (to quote Chomsky), leaving so many of us with a bonafide, diagnosable, collective dementia.
As for the film, all I can say is, if you have the time – given both its accomplishment and the zeitgeist of rhetoric and truth surrounding today’s War on Terror – rent it.
It’s hard to believe at least some of the grainy, black and white footage of the protests with the crowds and the police and the army etc. are not newsreel footage – but they are not.
The masses of “extras” are unflinching in their conviction, perhaps because the film was made a mere three years after Algerian independence, with the emotion and anger still palpable and accessible.
But raw style aside, Pontecorvo’s Battle For Algiers is remarkable because it is a political film that somehow, razor-like, walks so many lines as to be astounding: understandable if not likable characters from both sides, compassion and disdain for both sides, comprehension, somehow, of certain acts that are repugnant.
Legendary film critic Pauline Kael, supposedly after giving the film a strong review, said Director Pontecorvo is the most “dangerous kind of Marxist: a Marxist poet.”
Whether Pontecorvo was a Marxist, I don’t know, but he was a member of the Italian Communist Party until the Russians invaded Hungary in 1956.
Alan A Stone, Harvard Professor of Law and Psychiatry writes in an article called Reel Terrorism: Reconsidering the battle Of Algiers:
Pontecorvo claimed his filmmaking was ruled by the “Dictatorship of Truth� and his version of Truth certainly disturbed the French, who banned his film.
Certainly many critics saw in The Battle of Algiers the power of truth revealed.
Others—most prominently Pauline Kael—worried that the film took audiences by storm and gave them no chance to think.
Kael saw not truth but ultimate propaganda. The Battle of Algiers, she said, “ranks with� Triumph of the Will, Leni Riefenstal’s deification of Hitler. Whether revealed truth or ultimate propaganda, The Battle of Algiers is a text that might give Americans some perspective on our own situation after 9/11—both through its official message and through its unintended insights.
Pauline Kael was not wrong in describing Pontecorvo as a Marxist poet, but he meant his poetry as a celebration of humanity. He described himself as “someone who approached man and the human condition with a feeling of warmth and compassion.�
His film and his poetry were an attempt to connect himself and his Western audiences through their common humanity to Arabs of the Casbah.
He embraced what is different about the Arabs, including their Islamic traditions, and made them fully human for us.
Yes, revolutionary terror is a tragic necessity. But Pontecorvo’s inspiration is Utopian. Revolution, even in the style of Fanon, held for him the promise of community and comradeship in which Pontecorvo and perhaps many European Marxists imagined themselves sharing.
He made his audience share that feeling of community so that we might accept the possibility of justified terrorism.
Although I’m not exactly sure what Stone is saying in his criticism (pointing out a connection to Hitler’s Leni Reifenstal, through Kael, and saying “revolutionary terror is a tragic necessity”), the full article is here.
L’ENSEMBLE
All but one of the actors in the film, the French General played by Jean Martin, are non-professionals. Supposedly Martin got the job because he had been sympathetic to the Algerian cause in the first place.
Incredibly, the second Algerian lead in the film (after lead Ali La Pointe – played by Brahim Hadjadj) is actually one of the real leaders from the insurgency—Saadi Yacef.
The insurgency itself took place from the mid 1950s until independence in 1962 (but had many moments in France’s 132 year colonial rule).
I won’t say much more about it, but the comparisons, lessons, hatreds and problems seen in the film between the Algerians fighting for independence and the French colonialists, though necessarily simplified, and of course different than today in, say, Iraq, still profoundly remind the viewer of today’s tension and brutality.
The film is for that reason alone – and many others – instructive, thought-provoking, heart-breaking and infuriating, all depending on one’s ideology.
THAT’S NOT ALL, FOLKS: HIGH PRAISE
A grand bonus to the film are the many documentaries included on the 3 Disc Set.
Most of the documentaries are purely historical and deeply, sometimes shockingly, informative. One short piece, however, simply features world-renowned directors Spike Lee (Do the Right Thing), Julian Schnabel (Before Night Falls), Mira Nair (Monsoon Wedding—and married to African scholar Mahmood Mamdani, whom we interviewed for Uganda Rising), Steven Soderbergh (Traffic) and Oliver Stone (JFK), sharing the effect the film had on them.
Some of the bombings in the film – never pleasant – explode so startlingly close to people in the shot that, according to Steven Soderbergh (or maybe it was Spike Lee), they could almost certainly not, for reasons of safety, be shot the same way today.
Soderbergh said films like The Battle of Algiers and the French Connection were big inspirations for his film Traffic. The car chase in the French Connection was, by all accounts, also done in ways that could never be legally done today.
Anyway, here are an assortment of interviews and comments from the various documentaries in The Battle Of Algiers disc Set.
IMPRESSIONS
From a 1992 documentary narrated by Edward Said, film Producer David Puttnam (the Killing Fields) said, about making these kinds of political films – particularly in today’s climate:
There is always the danger that one way or another, you end up justifying the man with the bomb—or the man with the gun.
And I’m not sure we actually live in that world anymore. Gillo [Pontecorvo] made the Battle of Algiers during a period when post-colonial attitudes were quite specific and the world acknowledged that great wrongs had been done and great rights needed to be addressed.
I’m not sure we live quite in that world anymore. We now live in a world of infinitely more complexity and the film as made would have to tread a very fine line and be very, very sure that it didn’t end up accidentally justifying the unjustifiable.
Pontecorvo, who died recently, made very few films after The Battle of Algiers. Evidently, he was a perfectionist, always second-guessing himself in the pre-poduction, and also had several films he tried to make fall through.
About the political filmmaking process, Pontecorvo says:
All of us who made so-called political films find ourselves in difficulty. In part because there’s a marked decrease in the public’s interest in social, collective themes, in solidarity etc. Also because we’re less sure of ourselves after all that’s happened.
There are fewer certainties, and therefore less drive.
This causes many people to distance themselves from this type of cinema.
TORTURE
The French use of torture in the war is well known. From a documentary called Remembering History, Colonel Roger Trinquier , a charming enough man talking with a candor we rarely see anymore—for better or worse—described the situation this way:
Torture is a weapon used in all subversive wars. You must realize that.
For example, people in the OS were tortured. No one defended them. People involved in a subversive war know they’ll be tortured.
In WWII, members of the French Resistance violated the codes of war. They knew they’d be tortured but they did their jobs. Their glory lies in the fact that, knowing they’d be tortured, they still did what they had to.
When mounting an insurrection, you must do so fully aware that torture will be used. It’s not about being for or against it. You must realize that every prisoner who is arrested will talk. Unless he makes the sacrifice of suicide, we’ll always get his confession.
An insurgency must be based on this awareness so that a prisoner who talks won’t bring down the organization.
In a 2002 documentary (also on the Disc) by Patrick Rotman called L’Ennemi Intime (The Best of Enemies), Part III Etat D’Armes (State of Arms), an old interview with Trinquier again, has him paraphrasing very closely (and decades earlier) the argument that Alan Dershowitz has used to justify the use torture (the type of example that Richard Clarke later says, more or less, has nothing to do with reality):
The French Colonel Trinquier, again:
Suppose that one of our patrols arrested a bomber one afternoon. This bomber had one bomb and was going to plant five or six more.
By dismantling this one bomb, we’re able to learn that all the bombs are set to explode at 6:30 p.m. It’s 3 p.m. We know that each bomb kills at least 10 or 12 people and wounds about 40 others.
You have the terrorist. You can interrogate him or not.
In any case, at 6:30 p.m., you’ll have 40 dead and around 200 wounded. If you interrogate this individual, there’s a good chance he’ll reveal the bomb locations. If you don’t interrogate him, you’re responsible for 40 dead and 200 wounded.
Personally, I’m ready to interrogate him until he answers my questions…
He goes on to say:
In the Casbah of Algiers, there were 1,500 armed terrorists supported by a population of 5,000 that gave them information and help.
This is how we waged the battle: First, we wanted to know about their organization. To achieve this, this is what we did: You’ve read Mao Tse-Tung, who says terrorists are like a fish in water. That means all the residents know them.
One afternoon, in the beginning, we had around 30 young people, and individually we asked them, “Who collects funds from you?� They all told us. We released them the next day.
We arrested the fund collectors. We asked, “Who do you take the money to?�
And so on, up to the top of the pyramid.
SAADI YACEF
As mentioned earlier, Saadi Yacef was the military commander of the insurgent FLN (National Liberation Front (Algeria)) in the Casbah (the old Turkish area of Algiers, away from the Europeans) during the real battle for independence, and then played himself in the film.
In an interview many years later, he said:
They set off bombs. We set off bombs. That’s the price of war and violence.
It was a means to an end, and we achieved that end. It’s such a vicious cycle.
It’s not a personal evil. You’re immersed in hell and you have to be—I was fighting for a cause.
If I was able to hold on for two years, thinking every morning they’d come for my head, it was because I was convinced I was fighting for a just cause. Even if they cut off my head, it wouldn’t matter.
I was brave because I wasn’t a thief or common criminal.
I was fighting to free my country. Too bad [tant pis]. History will be my judge.
Later on, perhaps curiously, perhaps not, Saadi Yacef became a movie producer and in 1999 was appointed to the upper house of the Algerian parliament, the Council of the Nation.
GENERAL JACQUES MASSU
One of the main French leaders, General Jacques Massu (who later adopted two Algerian children and died in 2002 at the age of 94) was interviewed (I think during or just after the war), and like Trinquier, was incredibly candid:
Question:
Doesn’t the very idea of torture disgust you?
General Jacques Massu:
I don’t like it, but, once again, I’m a soldier.
The circumstances of the war forced me to resort to this procedure. I don’t consider this procedure, despite the awful word used to describe it, to be more inhuman than bombing civilian populations or causing terrible wounds with gunfire.
It was a new procedure, never used before.
Often, it doesn’t amount to much.
It causes much less damage than a bullet through the heart or the procedures used by our adversaries, the FLN, on their own brothers, their compatriots. If they smoked, or didn’t respect other FLN orders and restrictions, they cut off their noses, or worse. That’s what I call real torture! I never cut off anyone’s noses, and neither did my men.
From the Patrick Rotman documentary, L’Ennemi Intime (Best of Enemies), Part II Etat D’Armes (State of Arms), General Massu wrote a note to his troops that, according to Rotman, deserves credit for its honesty.
Massu wrote:
The sine qua non of our actions in Algeria is for these methods [torture] to be accepted in our hearts and minds as necessary and morally valid.
CAPTAIN ALLAIRE
A Captain Allaire of the French paratroopers, extremely forthcoming, said this:
I saw it [torture], I participated in it, I ordered it.
I don’t want to lay the blame on my subordinates. I ordered it because that was my role.
I’m a devout Catholic, and it was two years before I could enter a church again. Obviously, my conscience was extremely troubled.
Morally, it was very difficult.
Should I have resigned from the army…?
I don’t think I lost my honour in Algeria. I’d say I lost a bit of my soul.
Another high-ranked officer—either Allaire again or maybe it was General Paul Aussaresses—admitted that FLN leader Larbi Ben M’Hidi , upon being captured by the French and interrogated, had been shot and hanged by the French (he was said to have committed suicide in his cell):
[For our methods of interrogation/torture] We were not only supported, we were encouraged.
I remember a specific example: General Bigeard had a well-organized command center with maps, charts and diagrams showing the day-to-day progress in crushing the rebellion.
We were visited by Borges-Maunory, Max Lejeune, General Salan and Robert Lacoste and his chief of staff.
I remember when [FLN leader] Ben M’Hidi was captured—they were ecstatic over the effectiveness of the work carried out by the various paratrooper regiments. These politicians found the results convincing and the method good, and they encouraged us in that direction.
With Algiers in disarray, the police gave over power to the French Paratroopers, who were brought in to quell the flames of rebellion.
PAUL TEITGEN
Paul Teitgen, who was secetary general of the police in Algiers, refused to give up all civilian power to the military and recorded every arrest.
Teitgen, from a very old interview:
We confined 24,000 [suspects] with my signature. There are 4,000 missing. They didn’t give me back 4,000.
In September 1957, I tallied it up. There were too many missing.
Where were they? In the camps? At Paul-Cazelles [a camp]?
No, I went and they weren’t there. They disappeared.
The rivers and the sea carried them away, carried away the “Bigeard shrimp.� That’s what they called the men. They’d put their feet in a bucket of cement.
When it set, they’d throw them out of helicopters into the sea.
That’s unacceptable. That’s no way to wage war.
In his resignation letter to Le Secretaire General, Perfecture D’Alger (ALGER, le 29 mars 1957), Teitgen wrote:
I’ve been convinced for three months now that acting anonymously and without responsibility can only lead to war crimes.
I wouldn’t dare make such a statement were it not for a recent visit to the Paul-Cazelles and Beni-Messous camps, where I recognize, on certain prisoners, signs of abuse and torture like I personally suffered 14 years ago at the hands of the Gestapo in Nancy.
In another interview, Teitgen said:
I was tortured in 1943. Several times by the Gestapo. They know how to humiliate a man, how to deprive him of all respect, how to reduce him to nothing. Then there was the Dachau concentration camp.
That was enough for me. I couldn’t bear the French acting the same way.
In the epilogue from one of the documentaries:
According to the best estimates, the seven-and-a-half year war claimed 500,000 lives, mostly Algerians.
French casualties amounted to 12,000 killed and 25,000 wounded. The months after independence saw the massacre of tens of thousands of harkis, Algerians who fought on behalf of the French, while nearly a million pieds noirs [French in Algeria], fearing for their safety, fled the country.
As is so often the case, The FLN went on to become a one party-rule dictatorship that stayed in power for almost thirty years, beginning with good changes in education and so on, and eventually becoming corrupt and brutal.
One final dopcumentary on the disc was a 20 minute or so piece called The Battle of Algiers: A Case Study (2004), where Christopher Isham, Chief of Investigative Projects for ABC News has a conversation about the film, history and terrorism with George W Bush’s ex-adviser Richard A. Clarke, former national Coordinator For Security and Counterterrorism and Michael A. Sheehan, former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
It is remarkable to watch.
After having just watched the film, and then the several documentaries on the 3- Disc set, I heard it repeated time and time again by, I think, all of the historians (two British, I believe, one French and one Algerian), that it was the French authorities who planted the first bomb that indiscriminately blew up Algerian citizens, not the terrorist insurgents.
Ironically, as it was pointed out in one of the documentaries – at least from a civilian bombing point of view – counterterrorism proceeded terrorism, which just goes to show how absurd the use of the word terror can become—although brutal, cruel terror was undeniably a massive part of the Algerian War.
Anyway, somehow, Chris Isham from CBS, although having seen the film and the French bomb a building in the Casbah, killing many civilians, still asks without an ounce of confusion:
What else could the French of done? I mean, the precipitating event in the movie, you see three women being deployed into the general population [by the FLN], going across French lines.
They’re outfitted with bombs.
They place the bombs in cafes and other populated places. The bombs go off.
Obviously creates a huge shock among the French civilian population and that leads to the French crackdown. What else could the French have done when confronted with those kinds of facts on the ground?
Isham’s perception of the “precipitating moment� actually takes place over 40 minutes into the film, and is directly after the French have just blown up a civilian building in the densely packed Casbah, after curfew, in the middle of the night, killing countless Algerians, men, women and children.
Granted, it may have just been a strange, momentary lapse of sense from Isham—but it falls directly into the Chomsky/Herman model of internalizing one’s own propaganda system.
Worse, terrorism expert Michael Sheehan responds without correcting Isham:
Sheehan:
When these type of events take place, you have to take a deep breath and step back a little bit before you do anything overly heavy-handed that might come back to haunt you.
And Isham asks Richard Clarke earlier:
Isham:
Let’s just talk a little bit about the tactics of the insurgents themselves.What were they trying to accomplish? What did they represent? What tactics did theyuse that you consider being terrorist tactics? Why? And…what was the outcome of those activities?
Richard Clarke replies:
So much of it was bombing. Bombing in an urban environment and including multiple, simultaneous bombings around the city…By [the FLN] doing the attacks, it caused their own people to wake up. And then of course the attacks forced a reaction from the police and the army which made the Algerian people even more desirous of liberation.
Curious, to say the least.
Although this Isham-Clarke-Sheehan discussion was probably considered relevant because of what is going on in Iraq, it was mostly about how to have effective counterinsurgency.
Not once, specifically, was the position of America in Iraq, Vietnam in the 60s and 70s, or even, for the most part, the French in Algeria, directly questioned as to its moral legitimacy.
And it was debated with such cool, earnest almost rehearsed reason—a cool reason that, the older I get, the more I sometimes think stops a person from seeing or even feeling a bigger picture.
The following thought is hardly revolutionary – if you’ll excuse the pun – but it seems to me most of these heinous wars show, be they in Iraq after the tyrant Hussein and now, in Iran after the Shah, in Cambodia after the secret bombings from 1970ish-75, in Algeria and most of the countries of Africa after their independences, that it is virtually only brutal power that can overthrow (let alone survive) powerful brutality – and then the insurgent force ascends to power, and almost by definition maintains itself through brutality.
As Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl once said, generalizing, of course: The best “will not return.”
In Algeria, ultimately, its power and brutality got rid of the powerfully cruel French, and then power and cruelty (even if it begins well) ruled in Algeria for decades, only to be challenged by the FIS—the fundamentalist Islam—who became the next problem.
Even during the fighting for independence, there were grotesque massacres by the FLN of suspected French sympathizers.
As for the war to against the FLN nearly thrity years later, according to Wikipedia:
The Algerian Civil War was an armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamist rebel groups which began in 1991… when the government cancelled elections after the first round results had shown that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party would win, citing fears that the FIS would end democracy.
After the FIS was banned and thousands of its members arrested, Islamist guerrillas rapidly emerged and began an armed campaign against the government and its supporters.
They formed themselves into several armed groups, principally the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), based in the mountains, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), based in the towns.
The guerrillas initially targeted the army and police, but some groups soon started attacking civilians. In 1994, as negotiations between the government and the FIS’s imprisoned leadership reached their height, the GIA declared war on the FIS and its supporters, while the MIA and various smaller groups regrouped, becoming the FIS-loyalist Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).
It is estimated to have cost between 150,000 and 200,000 lives. More than 70 journalists were assassinated, either by security forces or by Islamists. The conflict effectively ended with a government victory, following the surrender of the Islamic Salvation Army and the 2002 defeat of the Armed Islamic Group.
In the end, details aside, what is the inherent difference between racism, colonialism, terrorism, fascism and fundamentalism? Having said that, these are words so misused to have lost compelling meaning, yet remain compelling for divisiveness and manipulation—while a certain truth, of course, remains within them.
To quote the insurgent terrorist/freedom fighter Saadi Yacef:
It’s such a vicious circle.
It’s also a long, spiraling circle of viciousness and beauty, begun who knows when.
How Iraq or Afghanistan can be any different, I don’t know.
Perhaps in, say, Vietnam today, after surviving the cruelty and barbarity of the Japanese, then the French, then the Americans, then their own Communist government, then the endless sanction and embargoes as punishment for being relentlessly bombed and not surrendering, the people are just too utterly worn out from history and violence, that they will do anything to not fight.
But who knows? – and of course my last statement is really just a statement of my unknowing. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
Love more, love everybody more—sisters and brothers—and hold on to your humour, joy, and compassion,
Pete xox